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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 890418-CA

ROBERT L. WILLIAMS and
JAMES R. WILLIAMS,

Priority No. 14b

Defendants.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1. Jurisdiction.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction

to consider and hear this appeal pursuant to the provisions of
Section 78-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and Rule 3 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Utah, and pursuant to an Order of the
Supreme Court of Utah the case was "poured-over to the Court of
Appeals" the 29th day of June, 1989.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal

is from a judgment

signed

the 31st day of

January, 1989, entered the 1st day of February, 1989, (signed by
the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby, judge in and for the Second
Judicial District Court) which judgment was granted pursuant to
Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Entry of Judgment without hearing
on defendant James Williams1 objection to plaintiff's Motion, and
which judgment was subsequently amended the 20th day of June, 1989,

1

pursuant to plaintiff's Rule 60(a) Motion to Amend,

Appellants

seek review of the judgment and the proceedings leading up to the
granting of that judgment and the proceedings subsequent thereto
resulting in the amendment of the judgment; the specific rulings
of the court being appealed include the Judgment granted the 31st
day of January, 1989; the Order granting plaintiff's motion to
amend, entered by the trial court the 21st day of June, 1989; the
Amended Judgment granted the 20th day and entered the 21st day of
June,

1989;

the

trial

court's

ruling

on

defendant's

motions

subsequent to the entry of the Amended Judgment identified by the
trial court as a "Ruling On Motion To Strike" dated the 27th day
of July, 1989 and the Order based thereon dated the 16th day of
August, 1989.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

(1)

Whether

the Court

abused

its discretion, denied

defendant due process or otherwise improperly compelled defendant
James Williams to elect between the risk of contempt of court and
a jail sentence, or stipulate that he had signed the questioned
document,
(2)

Whether

the Court

abused

its discretion, denied

defendant due process or otherwise improperly granted judgment on
plaintiff's motion where the plaintiff had failed to reduce the
agreement to writing or otherwise obtain a court order effecting
the agreement, particularly where the oral agreement was incomplete
2

and where plaintiff continued to identify the defendant as Robert
Williams.
(3) Whether the Court had jurisdiction to grant an order
or judgment against Robert Williams.
(4) Whether the Court could amend a judgment as against
a party that the original judgment was not sought against.
(5) Whether the Court abused its discretion in failing
to consider defendants1 response to plaintiff's motion to amend.
(6)

Whether the Court abused its discretion in signing

the amended judgment without considering the objections and the
Rule 60 Motion filed relative thereto.
(7)

Whether

the

Court

abused

its

discretion

or

alternatively whether it is a denial of due process to deny a party
against whom a final order is being sought an opportunity for oral
argument and/or a public hearing.
(8) Whether the Court committed error in ruling that the
"error11 of the original judgment was clerical in nature when the
original motion seeking judgment was directed to Robert Williams
and not James Williams.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES
(See Addendum for verbatim text)
(1) Casentini v. Hinesy 625 P.2d 1174 (Nevada 1981)
(2) Dove v. Cude f 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985)
(3) Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024

(Utah 1987)

(4) Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988)

(5) Olson v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources; 666 P.2d 188
(Idaho 1983)
(6) Rizzo v. State, 497 N.Y.S.2d 417 (A.D.2 Dept. 1986)
(7) The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States of America.
(8) The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States of America.
of Utah, (9) Article I Section 1 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah. (10) Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of the State
(11)

Rule 36 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(12)

Rule 37(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(13)

Rule 54 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(14) Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(15)
Rule 4-501
of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.
(16) Rule
Administration.
(17)
Administration.

4-501(3)

Rule

4-504

of
of

the
the

Utah
Utah

Code
Code

of

Judicial

of

Judicial

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

The case below arose out of a claim against Robert L. Williams
alleging that he was liable for the "open account" debt of the
corporation "K & W Linoleum Shop, Inc." by virtue of an "agreement"
Robert Williams had allegedly executed, which document plaintiff
had attached to its original complaint (Record of proceedings in
the trial court, at page 3; hereafter referred to as "Record at

3") . The case against Robert Williams was dismissed and plaintiff
proceeded against the son of Robert Williams, James R. Williams,
on the same claim.

At the time for pretrial, James Williams and

counsel were admonished and advised by the court that if James
persisted

in denying

plaintiff proved

that he had

signed

at trial he had signed

signature plaintiff had

alleged

the "agreement" and
the agreement

(which

initially was that of Robert

Williams, which is illegible and was purportedly signed in 1979
some nine years earlier, which James Williams had already denied
in responding to Requests For Admissions and which he told the
court that he did not recall signing the subject document) the
court "guaranteed" jail would be imposed (Transcript of April 25,
1988 pretrial, at page 11 lines 8-9; hereafter "Pretrial at 11, L
8-9").
Thereafter, at the time set for trial, a stipulation of sorts
was reached.
completed.
upon

The documents formalizing the stipulation were never
Plaintiff submitted a motion seeking judgment based

defendant

"Robert L. Williams" default; defendant James

Williams objected to judgment, denied being in default and tendered
continued performance of the agreement even though plaintiff had
failed to complete the documents; and without a hearing or notice
that the matter was being submitted for decision, the court granted
judgment

against

Robert

L. Williams.

Subsequent

proceedings

resulted in the trial court's amendment of the judgment to be
against James R. Williams.
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II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The case below was originally commenced by plaintiff's filing
an action against Robert L. Williams; the complaint incorporated
an "agreement" allegedly executed by Robert L. Williams titled
"application for credit" and was apparently for the benefit of a
corporation identified as K & W Linoleum Shop, Inc. The basis for
plaintiff's cause of action was one based upon a debt allegedly
incurred by the corporation

(hereafter referred to as "K & W")

pursuant to an open account, and one for which plaintiff alleged
Robert L. Williams had given a personal guarantee (the "agreement"
attached

to

plaintiff's

complaint, hereafter

referred

to

as

"agreement"). Plaintiff alleged that Robert L. Williams was liable
for the debt of "K & W" in a sura in excess of $30,000.00.
The complaint was later dismissed and plaintiff's motion to
amend

to

name

James

R.

Williams

as

defendant

was

granted;

substituting James R. Williams as the party plaintiff was claiming
was liable for the open account debt of "K & W" based upon the same
document, the "agreement" attached to the original complaint.
At the time set for trial, the parties discussed settlement
and an understanding was arrived at, which settlement amounted to
defendant James R. Williams' agreement to pay plaintiff the total
sum of $16,601.50 over a two year period, the unpaid balance to
carry interest at 11% and monthly payments estimated to be $500.00
per month (Transcript of proceedings on the 16th day of September,
1988, at page 3 lines 8 through 20; hereafter referred to as TrialT at 3, L 8-20).

Some details of the "stipulation" remained to be

worked out and there were multiple recesses wherein the trial court
retired to permit the parties to negotiate further; i. e. at page
6 line 25 (Trial-T) the court states: "Let me get out of your
negotiation.

You chat with each other.

Let me know when you're

ready for me to come back in."
The September 16 proceeding concluded with plaintiff's counsel
representing to the court that she would "draw the documents."
(Trial-T at 7, L 24)

Thereafter plaintiff's counsel submitted

multiple drafts of a stipulation purportedly representing that
reached in court; in addition to calculation errors (orf at the
least, conflicts between counsel as to the correct amount of the
monthly payments) plaintiff's drafts all incorrectly identified the
defendant party as "Robert L. Williams" who is the father of James
R. Williams.

Even though James Williams had already tendered

$5,000.00 toward the settlement, for very obvious reasons counsel
for defendants could not agree to or execute a stipulation binding
Robert instead of James Williams.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a verified motion seeking judgment
against Robert L. Williams, defendant objected, the court granted
plaintiff's motion and signed a judgment and both defendants joined
in an appeal therefrom.

Plaintiff subsequently moved the Supreme

Court to amend the judgment based upon Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
trial

court

to allow plaintiff

pursuant to Rule 60(a).

to seek

the relief

requested

In the meantime the Supreme Court caused

the case to be poured over to the Court of Appeals.
7

On remand to the trial court, plaintiff filed

the Rule 60

motion and defendants filed a response, asserting, inter alia, that
the judgment should not be amended. (Record at 65-68)

The trial

court granted plaintiff's motion and signed an amended

judgment

against James Williams without hearing. Defendant submitted a Rule
60(b) Motion along with other pleadings seeking relief from the
amended judgment and a hearing on the matters raised, which motions
were denied.
III. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
Judgment was entered against Robert L. Williams the 31st day
of January, 1989 and subsequently amended to be against James R.
Williams the 21st day of June, 1989.
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(1) On or about May 21, 1986, plaintiff commenced

the

above entitled action against Robert L. Williams, alleging inter
alia

that

Robert

"guarantee"

the

L.

Williams

payment

of

had

executed

the debts

of

an

agreement

a third-party

to

K & W

Linoleum Inc., to Robinson Distributing Co., Inc. (Record 1-2).
(2) On or about the 13th day of August, 1987 the Second
Judicial
ordered
Robert

District

Court, per

the dismissal
L. Williams

and

the Honorable

of plaintiff's
granted

leave

causes

Douglas

L.

Cornaby

of action

against

to plaintiff

to

file an

amended complaint against James R. Williams alleging that he had
signed the "guarantee."

(Both defendants have and continue to deny

the document purportedly executed in 1979 constituted a guarantee

Q

or agreement to pay the debts of K & W Linoleum, Inc.)(Record 911).
(3)

That at pre-trial before the Honorable Douglas L

Cornaby on the 25th day of April, 1988, the Court informed James
R. Williams personally and his counsel that despite defendant's
denial that he had executed the document that plaintiff alleges
constitutes
requiring

a "guarantee;"

the

plaintiff

that

to

if the defendant

prove

that

the

persisted

signature

it

in
had

initially alleged was Robert Williams was that of James Williams,
that "I want to guarantee that you, as counsel, you may go to
jail..." (Transcript page 11, Line 9, April 25, 1988 pre-trial.)
(4) That based upon the Court's threatening contempt and
jail if defendant failed to prevail on the issue of the identity
of the person signing the subject document some nine years prior,
defendant subsequently and reluctantly withdrew his denial relative
thereto and by way of a pre-trial order stipulated that he signed
the subject document.(Record 30-32).
(5)
involved

in

Distributing

That at the time set for trial the parties then
the
Co.,

action,
Inc.

Knight
and

Adjustment

James

R.

Bureau,

Williams

Robinson

reached

an

understanding described as a "stipulation," the general nature of
which was put on the record orally in fragments broken by further
discussion, modification and off-the-record negotiations. (Trial
Transcript).
(6) That as a result of the understanding it was agreed
that

the case be

settled

upon

terms and

conditions

that were

understood in theory but not in detail: i.e. an approximate monthly
payment over a specific time period was to be made but the exact
amount of the monthly payments was subject to calculation. (Trial
Transcript).
(7)
set

forth

Plaintiff was to prepare the documents that would

with

specificity

the

"stipulation"

together

with

an

appropriate order for the court. (Trial at 7 ) .
(8)
stipulation

Plaintiff failed to accurately prepare a written
consistent

initially an error
significantly

with

the

in calculating

identifying

the

oral

stipulation,

including

the payment amounts and most

subject

defendant

as

Robert

L.

Williams who had been dismissed from the lawsuit more than a year
prior, which errors were repeatedly pointed

out to counsel for

plaintiff. (Record 36-37, 40-41).
(9) Defendant James R. Williams made an initial payment
of

$5,000.00

despite

the

failure

of

plaintiff

to

prepare

an

accurate written stipulation, to demonstrate a good faith effort
to perform according to the agreement: (Record 36-37, 38-39).
(10)

That despite the failure of plaintiff to prepare

the documents as plaintiff had stipulated to preparing, and despite
the lack of a written stipulation or other documentation setting
forth payment amounts and due dates, plaintiff filed a "Verified
Motion For Entry of Judgment" seeking entry of judgment for the
amount prayed for in the complaint based on defendant's failure to
timely pay pursuant to the "stipulation" reached in court. A copy
of that motion is included in the addendum hereto. (Record 38-39).

(11)

That defendant James R. Williams responded by

filing an Objection to plaintiff's motion, filed the 27th day of
January, 1989; defendant's objection is included in the addendum
hereto, (Record 36-37) .
(12) That the Court apparently granted plaintiff's motion
and signed a judgment against Robert Williams the 31st day of
January, 1989, and same was filed the 1st day of February, 1989.
(13) That plaintiff rejected further tender of payments
pursuant to the oral stipulation.
(14)

That plaintiff filed a Motion to amend judgment

pursuant to Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that
there was a "clerical" error in the original judgment. (Record 54) .
(15)

That defendants filed a Response to plaintiff's

Motion to amend and objected to such amendment on the grounds,
inter alia, that the "error" was not "clerical" but substantive,
and that no verified motion had been filed against James Williams.
(Record 56-58).
(16) That on May 26, 1989 the Court ruled that the
"attorneys for the defendant, James R. Williams, do not object to
the amendment" and granted the motion to amend. (Record 61).
(17) That defendants timely submitted, on June 15th,
1989,

an

Objection

to

the

proposed

judgment

submitted

by

plaintiff's counsel; a Rule 60(b) Motion and a Memorandum in
support

of

defendants'

Objection

and

Motion

concurrently with the Objection. (Record 63-68) .
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were

submitted

(18) That the Court executed the proposed judgment on
the 20th day of June without further proceedings, hearing or notice
to the parties. (Record 70) •
(19) That no notice of entry of judgment thereafter was
served in contradiction of Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration.
(20) That defendants' Objection and Rule 60(b) Motion,
together with defendants' Motion to Strike

plaintiff's response

to the objection and Rule 60(b) motion (as non-responsive) , were
denied pursuant to the trial court's ruling the 27th day of July
1989.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant James R. Williiams was denied due process of law at
several stages of the proceedings below, his arguments were either
ignored

or

overlooked, his

pleadings

were

either

ignored

or

disregarded, the trial court appears to have made some unfounded
or unsupported conclusions about the merits of James Williams'
defenses and accordingly denied James Williams an opportunity to
be fairly heard.

The trial court seemed at several stages of the

proceedings to be unfamiliar with both the substantive and the
procedural aspects of the case, including confusion as to the
identity of parties involved at the April 1988 pretrial, the nature
of plaintiff's claims (the court seemed to overlook that plaintiff
was alleging an obligation to pay the debt of a third, corporate
party) and the nature of the defenses raised.
12

Commencing with the

court threatening the sanction of jail on issues that defendant
James Williams might fail to prevail

on at trial, the court

conveyed to James Williams that it strongly favored the claims of
plaintiff.
When plaintiff alleged that defendant Robert Williams was in
default of a stipulation reached in court the day scheduled for
trial, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion without reading
or considering the objections raised by defendants, on the fourth
day after defendants

filed

their

response, without notice to

defendants that the matter had been submitted for decision and
without allowing defendants an opportunity to request a hearing.
When the matter was remanded to the trial court, to allow the
plaintiff to request relief pursuant to Rule 60(a) to amend the
judgment because of a "clerical" error, the trial court again
either did not read or consider the response of defendants, granted
plaintiff's motion without notice that the matter was submitted for
decision

and without

hearing.

Pursuant

opportunity

for defendants

to request a

thereto, the trial court granted

judgment

against James R. Williams based upon a verified motion against
Robert L. Williams, which motion the trial court later describes
also as a "clerical error."
At the time the parties appeared for trial and a "stipulation"
was reached, the 16th day of September, 1988, law and motion
practice was still governed by the former Rules of Practice;
subsequent

thereto

and

prior

to the plaintiff's

filing

of a

verified motion seeking judgment the rules set forth in the Utah
1^

Code of Judicial Administration took effect, particularly Rule 4501 and more specifically Rule 4-501(9) which allows the resisting
party ten days in which to request a hearing after the clerk has
been notified to submit the matter for decision.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING PLAINTIFF1S VERIFIED MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT
The parties appeared at the trial court the 16th day of
September, 1988, at the time scheduled for trial. Counsel for the
plaintiff represented to the court that the parties had reached a
"settlement agreement" (Trial at 3, L 8) and outlined the terms to
the court. Questions arose, however, and further discussions were
held off the record (Trial at 4, L 2-3), the parties went back on
the record and there were additional "misunderstandings" and again
the court went off the record, stating "Let me get out of your
negotiation."

(Trial at 6, L 25, emphasis added)

The parties

subsequently stated, on the record, that they understood what the
agreement

contemplated

and

the

court

stated

it accepted

the

agreement; counsel for plaintiff represented in closing (at 7, L
24) "I'll draw the documents, your Honor."
Rule 4-504 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration provides as
follows:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen (15)
days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct,
file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree
in conformity with the ruling.
14

(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be
reduced to writing and presented to the court for
signature within fifteen (15) days of the settlement and
dismissal.
Plaintiff failed to "draw the documents" within the time prescribed
and then, at a later time, plaintiff drafted and submitted to
counsel for defendants a "stipulation" that was not in conformity
with the agreement (See Record at 40-41 and defendant's objection
paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 at Record 36-37) but had substituted Robert
Williams as the party responsible in place of James Williams (there
were additional albeit minor discrepancies as to details like dates
payments were due and their exact amount); for obvious reasons
counsel

for

defendant

would

not

execute

plaintiff's

drafted

stipulation. In the meantime defendant James Williams had tendered
$5,000.00 to plaintiff toward the settlement.
Plaintiff subsequently submitted a Verified Motion For Efntry
of Judgment, as against Robert L. Williams, (Record at 38) alleging
inter alia that defendant had defaulted and that plaintiff was
entitled

to

judgment

for

$52,050.77.

Plaintiff's

mailing

certificate indicates that counsel for plaintiff caused a copy of
said motion to be mailed to counsel for defendant the 17th day of
January, 1989. (Record at 42)

Defendant timely filed a response

entitled Objection To Motion For Entry Of Judgment (Record at 36);
defendant's response was brief and to the point, barely a page and
a half

in length, explicitly

pointing

out, inter

alia, that

plaintiff was pursuing the wrong defendant and that James Williams
was ready and able to tender performance but for plaintiff's
1R

failure to agree as to the responsible party and the specific terms
(dates payments due and exact amounts, etc)•
No notice to submit the matter for decision was submitted
pursuant to Rule 4-501(8) Utah Rules of Judicial Administration,
which provides, in part, "If a hearing is not requested by the
Court, counsel shall notify the Clerk of the Court, in writing, to
submit the motion to the Court for decision." On January 31, 1989,
without allowing defendants an opportunity pursuant to Rule 4501(9) Utah Rules of Judicial Administration to request a hearing
and without defendant's waiver of the right to a hearing the trial
court granted judgment against Robert L. Williams. (Record at 45)
Settlements and stipulations are, of course, encouraged by the
courts pursuant to well worn principles of judicial economy and
there is a presumption as to stipulations whose terms are definite
and which are either made in writing or in open court upon the
record, that such stipulations are enforceable absent their being
set aside for justifiable cause.
1174

See Casentini v. Hines, 625 P.2d

(Nevada 1981), Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d

170

(Utah 1985),

Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987), Kinsman v. Kinsman,
748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988) and Rizzo v. State, 497 N.Y.S.2d 417
(A.D.2 Dept. 1986).

Stipulations and settlements, however, are no

more than a form of contract

(Olson v. Idaho Dept. of Water

Resources, 666 P.2d 188 (Idaho 1983)) and

their enforcement is

subject to applicable principles of contract law.
In the case now before the court, the "stipulation" was not
specifically read into the record, but consisted of commentary,
16

representations, discussions and questions between the court and
counsel for the parties, broken by at least two separate occasions
where the parties and/or counsel had discussions and negotiations
off the record.

It was clearly contemplated that the "stipulation"

would be reduced to writing.

Given the piecemeal, and sometimes

incomprehensible, manner in which the agreement was presented to
the

court,

and

recognizing

that

the

parties

had

a

firm

understanding as to the total amount and total time period in which
the payments were to be made ($15,601.50 to be paid within two
years), it is entirely reasonable to conclude that defendant not
only could anticipate that the specific terms would be specified
in a writing (that plaintiff's counsel was to prepare) but that he
could have such a writing to refer to and rely upon in carrying out
performance of the agreement, and that he could not be charged with
failing to perform until those specific terms were set forth in a
writing.
Rule 4-504(3) Utah Rules of Judicial Administration has an
obvious purpose, inter alia, and that is to avoid exactly the
difficulty that arose here: if and when the stipulation is timely
reduced to writing, subsequent enforcement of the stipulation if
necessary is simple and straight forward.

In this case, however,

the party charged with preparing the writing failed to do so and
in fact prepared a draft inconsistent with the agreement in a
particularly important detail: the identity of the party bound
thereby, and then sought to enforce the agreement as it had been
incompletely and piecemeal and with obvious contemplation that it
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would be reduced to writing, presented in open court; the same
party declined to accept James Williams1 tender of performance.
A natural prerequisite to enforcement of an oral stipulation,
particularly one that is not read into the record as an integrated
whole but whose terms are broken by off-the-record negotiations,
is

compliance

Administration;

with

Rule

4-504(3)

Utah

Rules

of

Judicial

it is not contested that the fifteen day period

specified in the rule is absolute, but before a party can seek
enforcement, particularly the party charged with the obligation to
comply with the rule, the stipulation should be reduced to writing
and an order granted adopting the stipulation as binding upon the
parties.

The trial court herein erred

in granting plaintiff

judgment in these circumstances.
Additionally, and perhaps an even more aggravating denial of
due process, as guaranteed by both the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and by Article 1 Sections 1 and
7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, the trial court erred
in failing to allow defendants an opportunity tp be heard prior to
judgment being entered.

Pursuant to Rule 4-501 Utah Rules of

Judicial Administration defendant had (including time for mailing)
until the 30th day of January 1989 to submit a response, then
plaintiff would have five days to reply, after which one of the
parties should give notice to submit for decision; defendant would
have ten days from that notice to request a hearing. The defendant
submitted his objection the 27th day of January, 1989. The court,
however, proceeded to grant judgment against Robert L. Williams the
18

31st day of January 1989.

Clearly, defendants were not given an

adequate opportunity to be heard; simple due process demands an
opportunity to appear before the court prior to the granting of a
judgment in excess of $50,000.00. The trial court committed error
in failing to allow defendants an opportunity for a hearing before
the court.
Finally, on this point, it is also clear that defendant's
objection was either overlooked, ignored or disregarded.

The

record was absolutely clear, but for plaintiff's rendering of the
stipulation

and the

identification of Robert Williams as the

defendant in the verified motion, that Robert Williams was not an
involved

party at that time, and in precise, simple language

defendant pointed out that error in his objection.
explicit

and

defendant's

absolutely

objection

accurate

(Record

point

of

paragraph

at 36) the trial

judgment against Robert Williams!

Despite the
3

of

court granted

It is apparent that the trial

court did not consider defendant's pleading and thereby denied
defendant due process,

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
JUDGMENT
The trial court erred
instance, as is argued

in granting

above in Point

judgment

in the first

I, and therefore that

judgment should not have been subsequently amended. Additionally,
however, plaintiff's motion to amend was specifically based upon
Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure seeking correction of a
19

clerical error. Plaintiff's verified motion itself, together with
the stipulation that plaintiff drafted, identified the defendant
party as Robert Williams;

Robert Williams had indeed been a party

defendant previously dismissed from the lawsuit.

Plaintiff did

not seek judgment against James Williams in the verified motion.
Perhaps counsel for James Williams is missing some intricacies of
the law that counsel has not had experience withf but it seems
incongruous on its face that a judgment granted based upon a
verified

motion against

one party

(i.e. Robert Williams) can

subsequently be amended on the basis of a clerical error to be a
judgment against another party (i.e. James Williams); that is, how
can the Court grant a judgment against James Williams, by way of
a Rule 60(a) motion or otherwise, when there was no motion against
James Williams to begin with?
Obviously plaintiff juxtaposed the identities of the parties;
defendant

pointed

that out

in clear

and

unequivocal

language

before the original judgment had been granted. Was James Williams
and his counsel charged with the duty to respond to the original
motion as if it named James Williams?

Was James Williams bound by

the proceedings directed to his father, Robert Williams, as if
they had been directed against him?
was plaintiff s error, clearly.

It was error, clearly.

It

It may have originated as a

clerical mistake in plaintiff's office, but one cannot imagine a
more substantive matter than the identity of a party, and as
plaintiff
proceeding

persisted, despite being
against

Robert

Williams
90

informed
that

of the error, in

does

not

put

James

Williams on adequate notice.
Robert

Williams

against

and

the

Plaintiff sought a judgment against

court

Robert Williams;

erroneously

granted

a

judgment

it was not a clerical error

at that

point: at the least it was an inadvertent oversight or the result
of

negligence;

it

may

have

been

more

deliberate

than

that,

however, as the father, Robert Williams, was the party with assets
and the financial ability to satisfy the claim.
The

trial

plaintiff's

court

verified

effectively

motion

to have

granted

an

amendment

it directed

against

to

James

Williams and a judgment based upon that against James Williams.
(See trial court's ruling dated July 27, 1989, Record at 90-92,
where the court stated: "This court is convinced that plaintiff's
'verified Motion for Entry of Judgment1

was a clerical error.")

That alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the identification of
parties in the judgment was not clerical error but arose from an
error

in

plaintiff's

motionl

The

result

was

to

deny

James

Williams an opportunity to be heard on the merits!

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
COMPELLING
DEFENDANT
TO
ELECT
BETWEEN
THE
RISK
OF
JAIL
OR
STIPULATE THAT IT WAS HIS SIGNATURE
ON A SUBJECT DOCUMENT
Prior
requests
including

to
for
a

the

April

1988

pretrial,

admissions

upon

the

request

Exhibit A attached

that

James

plaintiff

defendant

Williams

admit

to plaintiff's complaint.

James
that

had

served

Williams,
he

signed

The document had

been allegedly signed by Robert Williams according to plaintiff's
21

first complaint.
years previous.

It appeared to have been executed some nine
The document, while it speaks for itself, is in

part illegible and contains blanks and portions not completed.
There is no identification of the individual that apparently did
sign the document.

(A copy is included in the addendum hereto.)

James Williams denied that it was his signature.
after receiving

instruction

He did so

from his legal counsel as to his

obligations in responding to the discovery, including advise that
he

should

respond

truthfully

according

to his

knowledge and

belief, that it was not necessary to speculate but that if he
denied facts and plaintiff was able to prevail upon proving those
facts at trial he was subject to various sanctions as provided for
in Rule 36 and Rule 37 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Counsel for

defendant reiterated at pretrial that James Williams contested the
issue of whether the document amounted to a guarantee, contested
the issue of whether it bore his signature and contested the issue
of whether

plaintiff

had

ever

relied

upon James Williams in

extending "K & W" credit (particularly as plaintiff had initially
alleged it relied upon Robert Williams in extending the credit).
Counsel for James Williams advised the court that the matter
of sanctions had been reviewed with the defendant, "We reviewed
that with Mr. Williams but we contest that issue."

To which the

court responded:
That's fine. But, you understand if he says it
looks like my signature and it looks like all
other signatures, I want to guarantee that
you, as counsel, you may go to jail if you
just waste our time in there. (Pretrial at 11,
L 5-9)

The sanction of jail is not an appropriate sanction for the failure
of a party to admit a fact that an opposing party may be able to
prevail on at trial. The difficulty in this case was the fact that
the court did not even recognize who the proper parties were at the
beginning of the pretrial, the court wanted to know why James
Williams was present and not Robert Williams (Pretrial at 2); the
court was apparently not well familiar with status of the case and
yet it wanted to put the defendant on trial there, in chambers.
A cursory review of the subject document together with the fact
that it was nine years old, together with the fact that plaintiff
had

alleged

that

another

had

signed

the document

initially,

together with the defendant's good faith representation that he had
no

recollection

of

signing

that

document,

should

have been

sufficient for the court to defer to the fact finding process
(rather than interrogation with risk of incarceration) on that
issue.

It put counsel and his client in an awkward, difficult, if

not impossible situation; James Williams left that pretrial with
the distinct impression that the court was compelling him to agree
that he signed the document whether he had or not.
It is not unusual for a trial court to express some assessment
of various factual and legal issues in the course of a pretrial,
particularly if it will assist in settlement negotiations; in this
instance, however, the court

went beyond

the

bounds

of

its

discretion, gave an indication of its inclination even though
little of the evidence had been presented or argued, and threatened
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jail if defendant failed to prevail on an issue of fact. The court
had apparently taken sides in the case and the defendant was
apprehensive of the court and of what the court might do, including
but not limited to possibly imposition of jail sentences.

The

court's demeanor, statements, and threats were inappropriate and
constituted error.

Defendant was coerced by the court's demeanor

and threats into admitting what he challenged to be the truth.
Defendant's right to a fair and impartial hearing were thus denied.
Defendant's right to due process was thus denied.

CONCLUSION
The trial court below repeatedly denied James Williams an
opportunity to be heard, from the coercion to stipuLate that he had
signed the credit application, to the failure to comply with Rule
4-501

Utah

Rules

of

Judicial

Administration

and

granting

plaintiff's verified motion without hearing or an opportunity for
defendant to request a hearing, to the trial court's sua sponte
amendment of plaintiff's verified motion and granting of an amended
judgment based upon that. The lack of a written stipulation or an
order reflecting and adopting the oral stipulation was due to
plaintiff's negligence, in part, and in plaintiff's persistence in
placing Robert Williams name as the responsible party.

James

Williams had tendered performance which plaintiff rejected (see
defendant's objection Record at 36). The totality of circumstances
reflect a denial of due process and reversible error. The amended
judgment should be reversed and ordered set aside.
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Respectfully submitted this

M

day of^November, 1989.

William H. Lindsley
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to
Kathryn S. Denholm, 263 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115, this

•\t

day of S

er, 1989.

ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM
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•' DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 1
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property;
to worship
according
to
the dictates of
their
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.

Constitution of Utah, Article 1 Section 7
No person shall be deprived
without due process of law.

of life, liberty or property,

Rule 36. Request for admission.
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any other party a
written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of
the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request
that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact,
including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The
request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the
request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of
documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are
otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request
may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement
of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons
and complaint upon that party.
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set
forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the
request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by
the party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration
of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection
is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party
cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the
substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny
the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who
considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents 3
genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth
treasons wfry he cannot admit or deny it.
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the
sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an
objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court
determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule,
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition
of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to
trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred
in relation to the motion.
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense
on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any
other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

Rule 37(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or
the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36/ and if the
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness
of the document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the
court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the
reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including
reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless
it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to
Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground
to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was
other good reason for the failure to admit*

Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have t>een taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgrpent docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985).

Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with
leave of the appellate court.

Rule 4-50 L Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for providing courtesy copies of motions
and supporting documentation to the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for ensuring timely and adequate notice of
matters placed on the law and motion calendar and set for hearing.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all district and circuit courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a brief statement of points and authorities and affidavits relied upon
in support thereof. Points and authorities supporting or opposing a motion
shall not exceed five (5) pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), except as waived by order of
the court on ex-parte application If an ex-parte application is made to file an
over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the memorandum, and if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application
shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. If a
memorandum of points and authorities is filed in support of a motion, it must
be served on the opposing party or counsel and filed with the court no later
than ten (10) days before the date set for hearing.
(2) The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten
(10) days after service of a motion, but no later than five (5) days before the
date of hearing, a statement answering points and authorities and counteraflldavits.
(3) The moving party may serve and file reply points and authorities within
five (5) days after service of the responding party's points and authorities.
Upon the expiration of the five (5) day period to file reply points and authorities, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter for decision.
(4) The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with particularity to
those portions of the record upon which the movant relies.

Rule 4-501. Motions.

(continued)

(5) The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies,
and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(6) A copy of the motion, supporting memorandum and documents shall be
filed with the clerk's office as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Motions based upon depositions or supported thereby shall not be heard unless
the depositions are filed in the clerk's office at least two working days before
the hearing unless otherwise ordered by the court upon good cause shown.
(7) A courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of points and authorities
and documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the
judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date set for
hearing. Courtesy copies of all affidavits shall be given to the judge within the
time limits required by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Copies shall be clearly
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the hearing date. Courtesy copies
shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(8) Decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless requested by the Court, in which event the Clerk shall schedule a date and time
for such hearing. If a hearing is not requested by the Court, counsel shall
notify the Clerk of the C >urt, in writing, to submit the motion to the Court for
decision. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to opposing
counsel and parties.
(9) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or
any issues therein on the merits with prejudice, the party resisting the motion
may request a hearing and such request shall be granted unless the motion is
summarily denied. If no request is made within ten (10) days of notifying the
clerk to submit the motion for decision, a hearing on the motion shall be
deemed waived.
(10) All motions for summary judgment or other dispositive motions shall
be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the Court.
(11) The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A
verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings
thereon if requested by counsel.

Rule 4-504, Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments,
and decrees to the court.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for „he party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within a shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity
with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court
and counsel within (5) days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also he reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the settlement and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or
decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the
social security number of the judgment debtor if known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was
made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation.
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against said debtor shell not ba a condition precedent fe the ^ & f f l t f Q f t & t t ( # & ^ W W * # H M f t # u Q$» r "Mlf9 .n*'<?Py $Wj?tf*X wjlveU) demand, presentmen
for paymai.t^protasrrnoti«4vof protest or diligence.jJEftyfiiaa^
rtii; linrjifiiflniu
Should t^a undersigned eiact\to terminate this guarar^a such termination"'snailnot affect the'haoihtV o f tiifl Unaeistgned as to accW/m and aiiibCfrfts^nC
owing from said debtor. In ttre dvent ihatyuit \i instituted onihis guarantee tha undersigned hereby agrees to pay all Court costs and such additional sum as th
Court (nay deem reasonable*!* Attorney';
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RESIDENCE'
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RESIOENCE
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RESIDENCE
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DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY
D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 292-0447
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
Plaintiff,

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

vs.
JAMES R. WILLIAMS,

Civil No. 86-39441

Defendant.

Comes now the defendant in the above entitled action, by and through
counsel, and hereby objects to the plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment
and hereby requests that ihe Court deny the same based upon the following
facts:
1. There has been no order signed by the Court which would reflect the
terms and conditions of the stipulation.
2. Plaintiff's motion is not consistent with defendant's understanding
of the stipulation.
3. Robert L. Williams (named defendant

in plaintiff's motion) wa3

dismissed from this action in August of 1987 and is not a party to the present
action or any stipulation entered into between the parties.
4. There has been no written stipulation entered into between Knight
Adjustment Bureau and James R. Williams which would comply with the terms and
conditions of the oral stipulation.

|

5. Defendant James R. Williams understood that he would begin payments!

FILMED

pursuant to the oral agreement upon receipt of an appropriate order or other
written notice setting forth with specificity the payment terms and dates.
6. Defendant understood that plaintifffs counsel was responsible

for

preparation of the appropriate order.
7. Defendant has fully intended to comply with the oral agreement and
has been prepared to tender payment consistent therewith, and has in fact
tendered a sum that would render all payments current according to plaintiff's
understanding.
Dated this

day of January, 1989.

D- PAC^ <£(L^
D. Bruce Oliver
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
- —

i

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this _j ' day
of January, 1989, to Kathryn Schuler Denholm, attorney for plaintiff, at 263
East 2100 South, Satl Lake City, Utah 8H115.
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KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 0866
Attorney for Plaintiff
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 484-0091
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU
A Utah Corporation

*
*

Plaintiff

VERIFIED MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

*

vs

*
*

ROBERT L. WILLIAMS

*

Civil No. 86-39441

*

Defendant

*

On September 16, 1988,

Plaintiff appearing by counsel,

Kathryn Denholm, and Defendant appearing
counsel, Bruce

Oliver, entered

into a

personally and
stipulation

by

in the

presence of the court wherein the Defendant agreed to pay to
Plaintiff the

sum of $15,000.00

$6,000

before

on or

promises contained

with

a first

payment

October 16, 1988 together

in the stipulation

attached

of

with other
hereto and

included herein by reference.
That Defendant

failed

to make the first

that he paid $5,000 on or about

November 17,

payment

but

L988 and

has

made no payments thereafter.
WHEREFORE,
follows:

Plaintiff

principal

prays for entry

balance,

interest, $23,687.07; court
51,275.00

$31,987.30;

costs,

for a total of $57,050.77

$5,000, judgment balance

of

$52,050.77

judgment as
prejudgment

$101.40; attorney fees,
minus one

payment

of

together with interest

FILMED

a t t h e l e g a l r a t e of 12%.
DATED t h i s

/-p

day of jJajfruar

VERIPICA
Appeared before me this I^TTv
fay 0 f January, 1989,
Kathryn Schuler Denholm, who affirmed that she signed the
above Verified Motion for Entry of Judgment and that the
information contained therein is true and correct to her
knowledge and belief.

\Cozt\i
Notary Pu $-ic,residing at;
Salt Lake County,
County, Utah.

KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 0866
Attorney for Plaintiff
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 484-0091
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU
A Utah Corporation

*

STIPULATION

Plaintiff,
*
*

-vsROBERT L. WILLIAMS,

*

Defendant.

*
*

Civil No. 86-39441

This matter came for trial before the Honorable Douglas
Cornaby

on the

appeared

by

personally

16th

day

of September,

counsel, Kathryn
and

by

counsel,

Denholm;
Bruce

1988.

Plaintiff

Defendant appeared

Oliver.

stipulation of the parties made in open court,

Based

upon

it is agreed

as follows:
1.

Defendant

shall

pay

to Plaintiff., on

or before

October 16, 1988, the sum of $6,000.00. In addition thereto,
Defendant shall

pay to Plaintiff

over a period of two (2) years
11%.

an

additional

$9,101.00

with interest at the rate of

Payment shall commmence November 15, 1988,

in the sum

of $424.18.
2. In the event Defendant becomes more than thirty (30)
days in

arrears of

any

payment,

Plaintiff

may, on

it's

ex-parte motion

and affiavit, have

judgment for the unpaid

balance of the original prayer of the Complaint.
DATED this

day of

, 1988.

Bruce Oliver
Attorney for Defendant

KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 0866
Attorney for Plaintiff
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 484-0091
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU
A Utah Corporation

*
*

Plaintiff

JUDGMENT

*
*

vs

*
*

ROBERT L. WILLIAMS

*

Defendant

*

Civil No. 86-39441

Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Entry of Judgment came
before the Court, the Court

being

fully advised

and good

cause appearing, it it Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed:
Plaintiff is awarded a

judgment

against Defendant in

the prinpcipal sum of $31,987.30 together with

pre-judgment

interest in the sum of $23,687.07, court costs in the sum of
$101.40
total

and attorney
of

$57,050.77

fees in

the sum of $1,275.00 for a

minus one payment

judgment total of $52,050.77 together
legal rate of 12%.
DATED this
3/

day of

of $5,000

for a

with interest at the

c^*

^ * ^,

, 1989.
/*

BY THB-^COURT:
^

/

^

/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of

iUflBfjOT EM'EBELi

ap.E™

the foregoing

F,LMED

Judgment

to Bruce Oliver,

South Main, Bountiful, Utah

Attorney
84010

for Defendant, at
on

January, 1989.

Secretary

this JQ

day

505
of

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
April 18, 1989
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

84114

l&L 'I-

ALYSON BROWN
CLERK OF THE COURT
P. O. BOX 618
FARMINGTON, UTAH 84025

Knight Adjustment Bureau,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Dist. Ct. No. 86-39441
Supreme Ct. No.—%&&&&&—

Robert L. Williams and James R.
Williams,
Defendants and Appellants.

Respondent's Motion to amend judgment denied. Case is removed
to district court for the limited purpose of allowing appellee
the opportunity of making a similar motion to amend in that
count.

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

*\v
^

DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY
William H. Lindsley #1966
Attorney for Defendants
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 292-0447

B'f
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
Plaintiff,
:

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
RULE 60 MOTION TO AMEND

VS.

ROBERT L. WILLIAMS and JAMES R.
WILLIAMS,
Defendants.

Civil No. 86-39441
:
:

Defendants in the above entitled matter respond to plaintiff's Rule
60 Motion to Amend as follows:
1. Plaintiff's acknowledge that the judgment was entered in error
and have accordingly pursued an appeal to the final judgment; the matter has
been remanded with the single purpose of addressing whether the error was
"clerical."
2. Plaintiff's belated assertion that the error was "clerical" (see
Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) is inconsistent with the history
and record in this case:
(1) Plaintiff repeatedly drafted written stipulations referring to
"Robert Williams" which were rejected specifically because, inter aliaf the
improper identification of defendant; numerous communications were had
relative thereto. (It should be noted that Robert Williams is James
Williams' father, and as plaintiff was well aware Robert has substantially

far more assets and is far more solvent than James.)
(2) The written stipulation plaintiff submitted to the court
identified the defendant party as "Robert L. Williams,"
(3) The verified motion submitted by plaintiff identified the
defendant party as "Robert L. Williams."
(4) Defendant's objection, in paragraphs three and four, stated:
3. Robert L. Williams (named defendant in plaintiff's
motion) was dismissed from this action in August of 1987
and is n o t a p a r t y to the p r e s e n t a c t i o n o r a n y
stipulation altered into between the parties.
4. There has been no written stipulation entered into
between Knight Adjustment Bureau and James R. Williams
which would comply with the terms and condtions of the
oral stipulation.
(5) To accept the error as having been "clerical" in nature it has
to be the kind of error that a clerk or office worker would make, i. e. an
error in a mathematical computation or an isolated typographical error.
Herein, however, as paragraphs three and four of defendant's objection cited
above illustrate, both plaintiff's counsel and the court were unequivocably
and fully advised before the judgment was granted (assuming, of course, that
either plaintiff's counsel or the court read or considered defendant's
objection).
3. Defendant James Williams has tendered payment consistent with the
oral stipulation even though plaintiff has failed or refused to prepare or
submit a written stipulation in accordance with the oral stipulation, which
plaintiff has rejected.

/

CONCLUSION
The only question before the Court is whether the judgment signed by
the Court was a "clerical" error. Defendant's objections timely submitted to
the court prior to the signing of the judgment unequivocally identified that
Robert Williams has previously been dismissed from the lawsuit. Clearly the
error was not merely "clerical" and although plaintiff should concur in
setting aside the judgment it should not be amended pursuant to Rule 60(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure.
Dated this

J

day of May, 1989.
^ # William H. Lindsley •
Attorney for Defendants

/

/

:

-^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this <>

day

of May, 1989, to Kathryn Schuler Denholm, attorney for plaintiff, at 263
East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115.

In the Second Judicial District Court
&

in and for the

County of Davis, State of Utah
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

- -

]
]»

RULING ON MOTION
TO AMEND JUDGMENT

]

ROBERT L. WILLIAMS, et al.,

>

Civil No. 39441

Defendants.

The plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment came before the
court for ruling pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial
Administration. The plaintiff is represented by Kathryn Denholm
and the defendant is represented by William H. Lindsley and D.
Bruce Oliver.
The attorneys for the defendant, James R. Williams, do not
object to the amendment but want us to know that both counsel for
the plaintiff and the court were asleep since they objected to
the naming of Robert L. Williams as the defendant in paragraph 3
of their document of objection dated January 27, 1989. The court
acknowledges that both counsel and the court failed to correct
the mistake. The court does not find any ill will or improper
purpose in the use of the wrong name.
The motion to amend the judgment is granted pursuant to Rule
60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff is ordered to draw a formal order consistent
with this ruling together with an amended judgment.

Dated May 26, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Kathryn S. Denholm,
East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115; D. Bruce Oliver,
South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010; and William
Lindsley, 505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010 on May
1989.

Deputy Glerk

and
263
505
H.
30,

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
DAVIS C'ln-Tv, ijJAH

PBlHRYN DENHOLM 0866
//Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
P.O. Box 520308
Salt Lake City, Utah

JUHZ!

8 35 area

84115

«JU^Si5i.£LiIlJ^Lj^Ml
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAffiS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU
A Utah Corporation
Plaintiff

AMENDED JUDGMENT

vs
JAMES R. WILLIAMS
Defendant

Civil No. 86-39441

Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Entry of Judgment came before the Court,
the Court being fully advised and good cause appearing, it is Ordered, Adjudged
and Decreed:
Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against Defendant in the principal sum
of $31,987.30 together with pre-judgment interest in the sum of $23,687.07,
court costs in the sum of $101.40 and attorney fees in the sum of $1,275.00
for a total of $57,050.77 minus one payment of $5,000 for a judgment total of
$52,050.77 together with interest at the legal rate of 12%.
yi. c

DATED this

day of

1989.

< '"'

BY THE/€0URT:
/

JUDGE^ ' ~ V

'"'

/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to
Bruce Oliver, 505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah
Lindsley, 505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah
Defendant, on this

L£- ' ~'

84010 and William H.

84010, Attorneys for the

day °f June, 1989.

^efcretary
/

Defendants address:
35 East 2200 South
Bountiful, Utah 840D0

JULI^L

i cMlciildiJ

D.

•to 31 9 23 jj| «0j
In the Second Judicial District Court
in and for the

t!C...;

County of Davis, State of Utah
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,

• .-..

cv_ M

)!

RULING ON MOTION
TO STRIKE

I
;
]

Civil No. 39441

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT L. WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants.

This matter comes before this court on defendants motion to
strike with William H. Lindsley representing

the defendant and

Kathryn S. Denholm representing the plaintiff.

The defendant is

requesting oral argument.
The
motion

defendant
pursuant

Administration.

is
to

not
Rule

entitled
4-501

to
of

oral
the

argument
Code

of

on

this

Judicial

The defendant's motion is simply an extension of

the argument the defendant made prior to May 26, 1989, wherein
the court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend.

The court

granted the motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
On August 13, 1987, the court signed an order allowing the
plaintiff

to

file

an amended

complaint wherein

the

defendant

would be James R. Williams and not Robert L. Williams.

On August

26, 1987, the court signed an order amending the complaint and an
amended complaint was filed on August 27, 1987.
court

documents

showed

the

defendant

Thereafter, all

to be James

R. Williams

until the plaintiff submitted the motion for entry of judgment
which was filed on February 1, 1989.

The defendant, James R.

Williams, appeared for pre-trial on April 25, 1988, and again on
May 23, 1988.
1988.

He was also present for trial on September 16,

At each appearance he was represented

by counsel.

On

September 16, 1988, rather than proceed to trial the parties
stipulated to a settlement before the court.
The court has
reviewed the stipulation.
The defendant, James R. Williams,
personally stated to the court that he was agreeing to the
stipulation as stated. There can be no question about who the
proper defendant was.
Rule 60(a) provides:
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record...may be corrected by the court at any time of
its own initiative or on motion of any party...
The defendant's conclusion to his May 5, 1989, brief stated:
"The only question before the Court is whether the
judgment signed by the Court was a 'clerical" error..."
This court is convinced that plaintiff's "Verified Motion
for Entry of Judgment" was a clerical error.
Based on that
judgment the court ruled on the motion to amend on May 26, 1989,
and recognized that both counsel for the plaintiff and the Court
had failed to correct the error.
In the motion to strike the defendant still denies clerical
errors, but also raises other issues.
He claims the oral
stipulation by the defendant "did not contain the precise details
of the agreement, which plaintiff was to prepare and submit to
defendant's counsel and then to the Court." This is contrary to
the stipulation itself. The stipulation was clear. The parties
personally and through counsel stated that they understood 'the
agreement and that it would be binding on them.
It made no
reference to a writing or a future approval of that writing. The
court did instruct the plaintiff to draw a judgment, which was
not done.
This does not mean that it cannot be done later
without the agreement of the defendant.
The defendant's motion to strike is denied. The judgment
will stand.

The plaintiff is ordered to draw a formal order consistent
with this ruling.
Dated July 27, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

^JUDG^w:
Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Kathryn Denholm, P. 0.
Box 520308, Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 and William H. Lindsley,
505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010 on July 28, 1989.

Deputy C^/erk

ADDENDUM

Transcript of Pretrial April 25, 1988

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL I)! STR I CT COURT

1

2

IN AND I'OR DAVIS COUNTY

3

STATE OP UTAH

4

-ollo-

5
KNIC.MT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
a Utah corporation,

6
7

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 01
PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,

8
v s.

9
ROBERT I,. WILLIAMS,

Civil

No. 3 9 M I

10|
Do fondant .

111
HE IT REMEMBERED

121

Mini- on Monday, April

13

above-entitled matter earn < on for PRETRIAL

14

Judicial

15

Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUCLAS L COENABY,

District Court, in and

161
181

A N

in I: ho Second

for Davis County, State of
Presidvnq.

C E S :

For the Plaintiff

KATHRYN DENHOLM
Attorney at Law
6 60 South 200 East
Suite 100
Sa I t Lake Ci ty, Utah P.! I I

Eor the Defendant.

'WILLIAM II. LINDSLEY
A I torney a t Law
r r
>0 > South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010

19
20
21

l')RK, I

* * *

A P P E A R

17

7'\,

22 |
23
24
25

Man.-7 li. Davis, C.S.R

THE COURT:

Record can show we are meeting in the

matter of Knight Adjustment Bureau versus Robert L. Williams.
Counsel, identify yourself for the record.
MISS DENHOLM:

Kathryn Denholm appearing for the

MR. LINDSLEY:

William Lindsley appearing wibh

plaintiff.

James Williams, your Honor.
THE COURT:

And you are Robert Williams?

MR. LINDSLEY:
THE COURT:

No.

James Williams.

What does he have to do with it?

MISS DENHOLM:

Robert Williams has been dismissed

out and James has been substituted.
THE COURT:

Let's go to the plaintiff, first, and

you tell me what the issues are from your client's point of
view.
MISS DENHOLM:

Your Honor, this is an account on a

contract for materials and goods purchased for use by Williams
operating at this time as K and W Distributing.

We have a

personal guarantee on contract that was dated April of 1979
and the account continued for several years thereafter.

There

is a principal balance of approximately $33,000 on the
account.

That's based on the invoices.
THE COURT:

Is that the only issue?

MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

There would also be attorney fees.

Mr. Lindsley.

2

MR. LINDSLEY:

That is the issue, your Honor.

The

onl y additional matters would be the affirmative defenses that
we set out in our Answer to the Amended Complaint.
THE COURT:

J

Meaning what?

MR. LINDSLEY:

J

Well, No. 2, that's a general denial.

No. 3, is thait the statu te of limitations has been barred by
tha t.

We claim it's bc.rred by-THE COURT:

J

Well, statute of limitations—this is a

fairly clear open accoun t.

What's the date of the last charge

on that?
MR. LINDSLEY:

Well, I am not prepared to argue the

mot ion today.
THE COURT:

What motion?

MR. LINDSLEY:
THE COURT:
do it.

I don't have any motions.

Well, to argue the defenses.

Oh , you must.

I

This is the time when we

This is the time when I put you up against your task

to know exactly why you are going to trial.

That's what a

1

pre trial is f<Dr, not jus t for me to get, you know, to write

1

down informat ion.
MR. LINDSLEY:

Well, I'm not prepared to present the 1

def enses today, your Honor.

Plaintiff hasn't even presented

its case in chief.
THE COURT:
a p retrial is
you two.

But, you don't understand.

That's what

I want to know really the differences between

When you com6 to pretrial I want to say, what is

3

your claim.

I want to look at plaintiffs and say, what's your

claim and if they say—and they have said it.
things.

They said

You owe us about $33,000 on a personal guarantee and

I say to myself, oh, personal guarantee.
corporate or some business entity.
are going to pay.

That means it's for

They are guaranteeing they

What's the defense to it, and you say to

me, the defense is the statute of limitations and I say, all
right, to myself, well, and on an open account it's six years
on a written account and it's four years on an open account
and six years on a written account, you see, on a written
notice.
So, I'm going to force you right into every single
issue because I want to know what is really at issue here.
don't wait to trial.

We find out right now.

We

If we wait until

we go to trial, you see, then we draw sanctions against you,
if we find out we wasted everybody's time.
Now, that's the reason I'm asking.

That's why you

have to be prepared to answer the questions today.
MISS DENHOLM:

Your Honor, the last time that the

defendants charged against anything on the account was October
of 1984.

The business was involuntarily dissolved by the

Secretary of State in December of 1984.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, the last property delivered

was October of '84.
MISS DENHOLM:

That's right.

THE COURT:

1
2

two years.

It was filed in May of '86.

What's the defense to that?
MR. LINDSLEY:

3

It's only

Well, your Honor, we haven't—our

4

defense goes to the--we don't believe plaintiff is going to be j

5

able to prove the deliveries in '84 or '83.
THE COURT:

6

Well, tell me why not.

1
Tell me why they

7

can't prove that.

You know, to me, it's fairly simple.

8

either is or there isn't.

9

try to get it in under the statute of limitations, I want to

10

know about that, too, you see.
MR. LINDSLEY:

11

There

If they are falsifying records to

J

Well, your Honor, if you give me 15

12

minutes maybe to round up our witnesses and we can put on our

13

case before plaintiff even puts on their case.
THE COURT:

14

No.

You are missing the point of the

15

pretrial.

18

matters that are not honestly disputed and I want to get them J

17

out so that when we go to trial, if you say you have statute

18

of limitations, I want to know that it's statute of

19

limitations and then I am prepared to look for statute of

20

limitations.

21

when I go to court I'm looking for accord and satisfaction.

22

You didn't say that.

23

The point of a pretrial i s — I want to take those

I

And if you say accord and satisfaction, then

I am using an example.

So, we won't waste everybody's time, you see, by

?4

going to court and saying—I can read the Complaint.

!5:

see the Answer.

I can

I can see this and this and this and this.

1

1

I can see that you say those things, but, you know, 95 percent

2

of the cases, by the.time I get to the point we are at now,

3

then they will tell me what real 1y--after they have done their 1

4

research, after they have done discovery, they can tell me

J

5

what the real defenses are.

J

6

Now, if you are not prepared to do that today,

7

put a new pretrial.

8

come back and do it a month.

let's

Give them their attorney fee and we will

9!

MR. LINDSLEY:

10

THE COURT:

11

1

We are prepared to go to trial today.

Then be prepared to answer my questions

today.

J
MR. LINDSLEY:

1 2

I am prepared to answer your

I

First thing is, we dispute each and every

1

13

questions.

14

allegation of the Complaint.

15

1

T H E COURT:

1

I understand.

Tell me what your

J

16

evidence is going to be about the statute of limitations since 1

17

that is the question that we are on.

18
19

Let me switch it to you.

1
You claim there's a

purchase in 1984 under this agreement.

20

MISS DENHOLM:

21

THE COURT:

22

MISS DENHOLM:

23 1

THE COURT:

24

it.

25

Mr. Lindsley?

1

That's correct, your Honor.

What evidence do you have?
We have a corresponding

Okay.

I

J
1

invoice.

Pull one out and let's look at

Now, you have access to this, I assume, haven't you,

J

MR. LINDSLEY:
wanted to.

We could have through discovery if we

We tried to limit the attorney fees.

MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

This isn't the '84 one, b u t —

What's the date on that one?

MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

This is November of '83.

Still within the four-year period.

Okay.
MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

We have the signature.

What's the signature?

MISS DENHOLM:
president.

James R. Williams signed as vice

The agreement, as being a separate document.

There's a list of items and it's signed as having been
received.
THE COURT:

Now, what's the defense, then, for the

statute of limitations?

Will we be wasting our time with that

defense?
MR. LINDSLEY:

I am not prepared to look at that at

this moment, your Honor.

My point is this.

That there's a

corporate entity that had an open account with the plaintiff
for a period of time.

Sometime prior—and I am not certain of

the date, but the statute of limitations has expired.

The

corporate entity went to a cash on delivery.
THE COURT:

Now, you have a guarantee.

MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

Yes, we do.

Was there ever a cancellation of the

guarantee?
MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

No.

You are claimin g this is a cancel!ation, J

then, of the <guarantee.
MR. LINDSLEY:

We are claiming, as a matter of fact, I

there was a cash on delivery relationship that occurred prior

j

to 1983 between the corporate entity and the plaintiff.
THE COURT:

Doesn't make arly difference, does it?

J Does it make <any difference to a guarantee if you leave the
1 guarantee in ieffect?
MR. LINDSLEY:

Well, first of all, first defense is J

that there's no guarantee from James Williams.
THE COURT:
Show it to counsel.

Okay.

Okay.

Does it have his name on it?

MR. LINDSLEY:
THE COURT:

Let me see the guarantee.

I am not sure that does.

Well, you show it to me.

Does it have

1

his name <on i t?
MISS DENHOLM:

Yes.

Well, we believe it does

Signature is identical to other signatures.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Simple matter.

Is that your

J

signature on there?
It could be

I don't recal1 s igning

Doesn't matter

Look at it and tell me

MR. WILLIAMS:
that ever •
THE COURT:

if that's your signature.

8

MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

It could be my signature.

Does it look to be somebody else's

signature?
MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

Probably not.

Then that's not a defense, is it?

MR. LINDSLEY:

In the admissions we denied that

that's a personal guarantee.
THE COURT:

That doesn't matter.

What I'm trying to

keep you, counsel--you are going to wind up with sanctions.
You know, if you tell m e — I don't mind—if you honestly tell
me that's a defense and that's not his signature and we go to
court on that basis—but if we go to court and I find out you
are just pulling my leg when I get there, somebody is going to
be in contempt of court because we are not going to waste our
time in court on things the.t are really not contested.
We have got past the age in trying cases where we
just say, you know, I am not going to pay this thing.

You

know, if we honestly believe that is not your signature, you
see, then we want to try that.

We are going to say to that

other party, you are going to have to prove that that is his
signature so what they are going to do, they are going to pull
a bunch of other signatures out and maybe even have an expert.
I don't know.

We are going to make them prove it.

We are

going to make them have whatever experts they need to prove.
But, if they come and prove it or bring their

9

people to prove and fchey say,

well,

that's really not a

J

contention, then we are going to turn around—we are not going
to put sanctions against you, but one of you may be in
contempt of court for it because we are not here to play
games.

J

We are here to find out the truth, what the

relationship is between the parties and if you don't owe them
a dime, then that's the way this case is going to come out.
On the other hand, if you owe them $33,000, then you
are going to pay $33,000 without all of the necessity of

J

playing games.

J

MR. LINDSLEY:

Well, I don't believe Mr. Williams is

capable of paying anywhere near 33,000.
THE COURT:

Doesn't matter.

MR. LINDSLEY:
THE COURT:
dime.

I

There may be a judgment.

J

It doesn't matter if he can't pay a

J

That's not what we are here for; do you understand

I

that, Mr. Williams?

A trial is not to decide what you can

pay, only what you contracted to pay since this is a contract. I
MR. LINDSLEY:
Mr. Williams.

Our office has reviewed exhaustively

What the Court was looking at is a guarantee

that was allegedly signed nine years ago a n d —
THE COURT:

I understand.

MR. LINDSLEY:

And we deny that that Ls a personal

guarantee and we can test that issue.
Mr. Williams.

J

We reviewed it with

That under the Rule of Civil Procedure that

1
10

if, in fact, because v/e denied, pursuant to the request for
admissions, if the plaintiff is put to having to prove it and
does prove that, that tho Court could impose sanctions,
plaintiff's costs, additional costs.

We reviewed that with

Mr. Williams but we contest that issue.
THE COURT:

That's fine.

But, you understand if ho

says it looks like my signature and it looks like all other
signatures, I want to guarantee that you, as counsel, you may
go to jail if you just waste our time in there.

You cannot

waste time just because you want to waste time.
MR. LINDSLEY:

We are not prepared to admit that is

a personal guarantee signed by Mr. Williams, your Honor.

We

recognize sanctions are provided for by Rules of Civil
Procedure.

If the Court is advising me that I will be in

contempt of court because we are not prepared to admit, with
sanctions of contempt of court, possibly we ought to continue
this pretrial hearing and get an interlocutory appeal.
THE COURT:
appeal.

You will not get any interlocutory

There is no such thing on a matter of this nature.
MR. LINDSLEY:
THE COURT:

Your H o n o r —

No.

Listen to me.

Now, I run these

pretrials and I am going to run them the way I am supposed to
run them.

These pretrials are not a game.

These pretrials

are for me to find out what the issues are and when I ask you
if that's an issue, you just tell me~-you tell me it's

II

I
1

honestly an issue.

2

MR. LINDSLEY:

I am telling you it's an issue and

3

I am not going to be setting here and be threatened with going

4

to jail.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. LINDSLEY:

7

Yes, you will.

the contention—

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LINDSLEY:

10

me.

Yes, you will.
Well r I will not, your Honor.

THE COURT:

No.

Have the Bailiff come in here.

(Whereupon, the Bailiff entered the Court's

14

chambers.)

15

THE COURT:

16

you?

17

you can go right away.

18

pretrial.

Bailiff, come in here a minute, will

Sit down €here and if Mr. Lindsley needs to go to jail

19

21

You

sit down.

13

20

Excuse

May I be excused?

H
X2

Because we deny and we do not admit

You are not going to walk out of any

MR. LINDSLEY:

Your Honor, I would ask to be

excused.
THE COURT:

You cannot be excused.

You are going to

22

sit through this pretrial and we are going to find out what

23

the issues really are.

24
25

MR. LINDSLEY:

Your Honor, at this point, your

Honor, having been threatened with going to jail because I

12

contest an issue in this case, I don't believe that I am
emotionally in a state of mind to continue the pretrial.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's do it this way.

to pay her a hundred and fifty dollars?

You want

Is that a fair and

reasonable attorney fee for coining?
MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

Now, you come from where?

MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

Salt Lake.

It took you how long to get here?

MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

That would be reasonable, your Honor.

About 40 minutes.

And it's about the same period of time

back.
MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

Yes.

And you work at what amount?

We have

been here for only 20 minutes now, so that makes roughly, oh,
almost two hours.
MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:
a fair amount, then.

I bill at $85 an hour.

Okay.

One hundred and fifty dollars is

You want to pay her $150 for an attorney

fee, we will continue it for a month and you can come back
prepared to pre-try it.
MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

That's the option.
That is what I would like to do.

When you come back, I'm going to ask you

exactly the same questions and I want answers to them, you
see.

I won't let you out.

What I am objecting to is coming

13

to a pretrial and just saying th at is an issue,, but I don't
have an answer for her .
answer.

That's an issue but I don't have an

I denied it's so, so it makes it so.
What I'm try ing to get you to do is recognize that a J

pretrial has a purpose and it just isn't to go through a list
of things.

If that's all we are going through , I can read

1

your papers and I can jot all th is down here and when I get
through with the list I can say, all right, now, that's what
we are going to try.
My experience tells me that's not wh<at happens.

My

experience tells me th at when I get to trial, if I do that, in
reality, that's not an issue and that's not an issue and

j

that' s not an issue.
The purpose of a pretrial is for counsel to come in, J
you J m o w , you had time for discovery.

You had a chance to

I

look at that document and if tha t is really, M r. Williams, not
your signature on that document, that's fine, if that's not
your signature.

If th at's your signature and you don't

J

remember putting your signature on there, that 's all right,
too, but there's still the quest ion to be answered, is it your
signature on there.
We forget a lot of thi ngs we do nine years ago and
if I ask you about the statute o f limitations and he tells me,
here 1 s a document and this is fi led within the four-year
statute of limitations and this is probably six because it

14

appears to be in writing.
So, we are talking about a six-year statute of
limitations.
it's filed.

Sof we go back six years prior to the time that
We are talking about May 27th of 1980.

Then we

back off to that particular date and if I don't do these kind
of things, pretrials are worthless.

If I ask you questions

about them and you seem to just not be giving me an answer—
just, well, that's the way I said it so that's the way it has
got to be, then that's not satisfactory to the Court.
So, with that explanation, give us another date for
the pretrial.
TFIE CLERK:

May 23rd at 10:45.

THE COURT:

May 23rd at 10:45.

MISS DENHOLM:
THE .COURT:

Is that Monday morning?

That's a Monday.

We will put it on the

calendar then.
MISS DENHOLM:

Your Honor, may we make payment of

attorney fees conditional upon continuing with their defense?
THE COURT:

Conditioned on what?

MISS DENHOLM:

Would you want to impose sanctions

if—
THE COURT:

I want it to be paid before we come back

to pretrial.
MISS DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

And if they fail to pay i t —

We will take care of that matter.

Okay.

1C

You have your continuance.
MISS DENHOLM:

That's all today.

Okay.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
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THE COURT:

The matter on the calendar this morning is

Kinght Adjustment Bureau versus James R. Williams, Civil
Number 39441.
Who is going to make the presentation?
MS- DENHOLM:

1 will, your Honor.

Your Honor, we have reached a settlement agreement
in this matter.

We have agreed that the defendant will pay

to my client the sum of $15,000 plus court costs $101.50 and
a $500 attorney fee that will be on the following terms:
He will pay $6,000 principal within 30 days. He
will also pay the $500 attorney fee and $101.50 court costs
within 30 days.

The balance of $9,000 will be paid over

two years plus 11-percent interest.

We estimate the payments

to be about $500 a month.
In the event the defendant is in default of any
payment by more than 30 days, the plaintiff will be entitled
to entry of a judgment as prayed in the complaint upon
affidavit.
THE COURT:

Less everything that's already been paid, of

course.
MS. DENHOLM: That's right.
THE COURT: Is that your understanding of it, Counsel?
MR. OLIVER:

With one exception, if I can just speak

1

with Ms. Denholm for one second, your Honor.

2

(Discussion held off the record between

3

counsel.)

4

MR. OLIVER:

Your Honor, just one minor adjustment on

5

that.

6

complaint.

7

principal amount only and not to any interest or otherwise

8

that is claimed there.

9

That is with regard to the relief of pray for
He would be confessing to a judgment as to the

THE COURT:

10

Okay.

When you say principal, are you

talking about the amount stated at $31,987.30.

11

MR. OLIVER:

12

MS. DENHOLM:

13

That's correct, your Honor.
We would anticipate as well that a

reasonable attorney fee might be awarded in the default.

14

MR. OLIVER:

15

THE COURT:

We have no objections.
Attorney fees of these kind are continuing.

16

We used to give them an attorney fee that was really far more

17

than what's currently done justified with the thought that

18

there's going to be work in the future.

19

But now we've tried to slow that down and let you

20

supplement that from time to time on an attorney fee basis so

21

that you're being paid ultimately but not any more than what

22

you have done.

23

I

24

MS. DENHOLM:
THE COURT:

25

assume?

I

Okay.

All right.

You're with Knight Adjustment, I

1

MS. DENHOLM:

It's Mr. Carlson.

2

of Knight's assignor.

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. DENHOLM:

5

THE COURT:

6

Of what?

Well, we normally ask:

MS. DENHOLM:

MR. CARLSON:

11

THE COURT:

MR. CARLSON:

14

THE COURT:

17

He has the authority to approve the

Do you want to state your name?
Douglas S. Carlson.
You understand what counsel has stated to

the Court?

13

16

Yes.

THE COURT:

10

15

Is he the one that

settlement.

9

12

Robinson Distributor, who is the assignor.

can make the decision here?

7
8

He's a representative

In terms of the interest that
Everything.

—

You heard the agreement, didn't

you?
MR. CARLSON:

Yeah.

We decided that we were going to

waive the interest?

18

MS. DENHOLM:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

19

MR. CARLSON:

My understanding was that he will not

20

default.

And so the fact that we keep the interest or not is

21

not really —

22

going to default on this.

I mean, I think it should stay because he's not

23

MS. DENHOLM:

24

previously, then.

25

MR. CARLSON:

Okay.

I misunderstood what you said

You're not agreeing to waive the interest?
The interest, I mean, 31,000 or 50,000,

1

it's all relative to his ability to meet his agreement with

2

us and so..•.

3

MS. DENHOLM:

4

Yeah.

Apparently, your Honor, I misunderstood my client's

5

statement earlier.

6

interest.

7

Uh-huh (affirmative).

He's not approving the discount of the

That's a matter we didn't discuss before we came.

THE COURT:

Do you want me to leave again and let you

8

talk some more, or do you want to start trial?

9

which.

10

MR. OLIVER:

I don't care

Your Honor, in discussing this this morning

11

between counsel, and I represented to my client -- She had

12

indicated that they take a confession of judgment or take a

13

judgment on the 31,000 in the event of default with the

14

30-days grace period.

15

client.

16

And that's what I represented to my

I had no problem with that.

He accepted that.

When she indicated that they would take judgment

17

based upon the complaint, of course, the complaint asks for

18

interest, and I think it's something that we could probably

19

talk about and probably resolve in just a matter of a couple

20

of minutes.

21

in the contract initially.

22

valid, but I still don't see where it provides for interest.

23

It provides for attorney fees, but I don't see where interest

24

is included.

25

But I don't see where interest is provided for

THE COURT:

And the contract, indeed, was

Let me get out of your negotiation.

You

1

chat with each other.

2

to come back in.

3

I

(Recess.)

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. OLIVER:

6

Let me know when you're ready for me

Anything different?
No, your Honor.

He'll go as we stated by

I Ms- Denholm, to the degree that judgment can be granted as

7

prayed for in the complaint.

B

THE COURT:

9

MR. OLIVER:

10

That's part of what's stated in the

complaint, so we're conceding and going with her statement.

11

THE COURT:

12
13

What about the interest problem?

Okay.

Is that your understanding of what the agreement
is?

14

MR. CARLSON: Yes.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. CARLSON: Yes, your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

18

your agreement?

Is that your agreement?

Mr. Williams, is that as stated according

19

MR. WILLIAMS:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. WILLIAMS:

22

THE COURT:

23

of the parties.

Yes, Your Honor.

And that is your agreement?
Yes, your Honor.

The Court will adopt that as a stipulation
Who is going to draw the judgment?

24 I

MS. DENHOLM:

I'll draw the documents, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: That's all, then. Thank you.
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
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